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Abstract 
 
Chinese history has largely been defined by a transition of power from one major imperial 
dynasty to another, separated by notable times of division such as the Warring States (475 BC-
221 BC) and Three Kingdoms (220-280) periods. The early twentieth-century collapse of the 
Qing dynasty in 1912 is no exception to this historical trend and gave way to a twelve-year 
period termed the “Warlord Era.” Dating back to the 1960s, Western scholarly discourse argued 
that these warlords lacked the ideologies or visons to implement any changes outside of their 
own personal and political interests. This research contends that warlords were not merely 
interested in gaining power through short-term pragmatic efforts, but possessed larger 
ideological concerns within their governing policies over their respective domains. Three 
prominent warlords to emerge out of this era who complicate the oversimplified claims of 
warlord governance as pragmatic self-preservation are Feng Yuxiang (冯玉祥), Zhang Zuolin 
(张作霖), and Yan Xishan (阎锡山). This research utilizes historical primary and secondary 
source material, as well as archival material (Passionist China Collection 1921-1980) and 
biographies (Wo de Shenghuo: Feng Yuxiang Zizhuan), to provide anecdotal evidence that 
highlights how these three warlords’ progressive policies were shaped by deeper motivations 
than mere political survival. By challenging the preconceived notions of warlord governance by 
past scholars and filling in omissions and gaps, this research paints a more holistic portrayal of 
these warlords and their contributions to early twentieth century Chinese society.  
 
 
(Word Count: 249) 
Keywords: Warlords, Militarism, Republican China, Governance, Confucianism, Public Works, 
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Timeline Leading Up to the Warlord Era1 
 
1894-95   First Sino-Japanese War: War officially declared between Japan and the Qing dynasty. 
1900   Boxer Rebellion: Starts as revolt against Manchu (Qing) dynasty, evolves into protest against 
foreign powers’ intruding in China’s affairs. Ends in humiliating defeat for Qing military and 
leads to calls for changes in way China is governed. 
1905   The traditional Civil Service Examination system (keju) is abolished. 
1900-1911  Due to previous military defeats in the Sino-Japanese War and lack of authority during the Boxer 
Rebellion, steps are taken to modernize the Chinese army.  
By 1901, troops begin to gather from multiple regions of China and are trained into modernized 
units. Units are organized on a local basis, with some provinces retaining their own individual 
armies. The main modernized army, Beiyang (“great ocean”) army, is based in Zhili Province 
(modern day Hebei) led by imperial general Yuan Shi-kai (袁世凯).  
In this decade, young Imperial Army officers are sent abroad to Europe and Japan for training. 
Many of these trained officers would go on to become revolutionaries and overthrow the Qing 
dynasty, as well as become prominent warlords thereafter.  
1911  Wuchang Uprising: Mutiny in city of Wuchang begins 1911 anti-Manchu Dynasty revolution. 
Uprising soon spreads to most provinces  
1912  January: The Chinese Republic is officially proclaimed. Sun Yat-sen (孙中山) is appointed 
president.  
February: The Last Emperor, 6-year-old Puyi (溥儀), formally abdicates the throne, ending 
China’s millennium long imperial governance stretching back to the Qin Dynasty (221 BCE) 
founded by Qin Shi Huang (秦始皇).  
April: Sun Yat-sen fails to build strong government, leading him to hand over power of presidency 
to Yuan Shi-kai. Yuan ushers in era of dominant military strongmen, controlling all political 
power in China.  
1915  Yuan Shi-kai makes announcement of plans to install himself has emperor of new dynasty. 
Widespread pro-republican outrage sweeps across China and rebellions against the new “emperor” 
break out.  
1916  Yuan Shi-kai’s sudden death at age 59 ends rebellion against his government, but he fails to unite 
nation. Yuan’s death ushers in the beginning of the period in Chinese history known as the 
“Warlord Era.” For the next 12 years, warlords will largely ignore the central governments in 
Beijing, and fight for control of China as individuals or members of a military alliance. Over this 
twelve-year span, the warlords will number in the hundreds and fight to expand or maintain their 
power bases.  
 
 
 
1 Dates, information, and phrasing gathered from Phillip Jowett, The Armies of Warlord China, 1911-1928. 
For more detail of events from 1894 to 1930 defining the Warlord Era, see Jowett pp. 13-30.  
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Introduction 
 
“Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” This immortalized statement was 
made by Mao Zedong in 1938, but perhaps even better encompasses the preceding decades 
following the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1912.2 Chinese history has seemingly been defined 
by the transition from one major imperial dynasty to another, separated by intermittent eras of 
division in which multiple individuals ruled over sizable regions and obeyed no higher authority 
than themselves. In some cases, the collapse of certain dynasties created a vacuum that gave way 
to extended periods of disarray and fragmentation. Prominent examples of this are the Warring 
States (475-221 BC) and Three Kingdoms (220-280 AD) periods. The early twentieth-century 
collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1912 is no exception to this historical trend. From 1916 to 1928, 
virtually all of China was divided among numerous regional militarists, leading this period to be 
termed the “Warlord Era.” The general scholarly discourse on Modern Chinese political history 
gives this period scant coverage, often only in reference and as an introduction to the Nationalist 
and Communist movements that followed. As a result, even the most famous of warlords and 
their contributions outside of the military remain a misunderstood phenomenon in modern 
Chinese history. Edward McCord describes this problem, asserting that “The lack of sustained 
Western scholarly attention to Chinese warlordism suggests that the historical relevance of this 
topic is still not fully appreciated.”3 Why have the contributions by warlords during this period 
been drastically overlooked? How has the oversimplified narrative of warlord governance 
 
2 Mao Zedong, “Problems of War and Strategy” (November 6, 1938), Selected Works, Vol. II, 224. Mao 
Zedong coined the phrase “Qianggan zi limian chu zhe zhengquan” (“枪杆子里面出政权”) in a November 6, 1938 
speech at the sixth Plenary Session of the CPC's sixth Central Committee. Although often left out, the following line 
of the same speech reads, “Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to 
command the Party.” This solidified an existing precedent emerging from the Warlord Era—that Chinese 
government authority lies in its wielding of military power. This precedent persists in China in the 21st century.  
 
3 Edward A. McCord, The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism (University 
of California Press, 1993), 2. 
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created misconceptions about the larger ideological concerns of particular warlords from this 
era? 
Previous paradigms have portrayed the warlords in a monolithic way, obscuring their true 
impact during this transitory period of Modern Chinese political history. Perhaps past scholarly 
attention has solely focused on the military and large-scale political consequences of the Warlord 
Era because, as a whole, the warlords were destined for destruction. However, the origins of a 
form of Chinese political authority that rest with a military strongman emerged out of the 
Warlord Era. The subsequent Nationalist (KMT) and Communist (CCP) movements were 
profoundly influenced by the warlord environment from which they originated. This research has 
a focused aim: to broaden restrictive paradigms about the Warlord Era and examine individual 
warlords’ systems of governance in order to create a more holistic view of modern Chinese 
political developments and modernization. In addition, more in-depth understanding of the 
Warlord Era and the nature of warlord governing ideologies is needed to better recognize the 
significance of regionalism and fractal governance within Chinese governance throughout the 
twentieth-century.  
China has always been a geographical space with strong local and regional variations in 
language, habits, and traditions. James E. Sheridan asserts that due to certain limitations, even 
some of the most effective Chinese dynasties with firm centralized authority struggled to develop 
transportation and communication facilities capable of uniting the vast regions of China at its 
political center. As a result, incentives toward national patriotism have historically been few and 
weak, whereas provincial and local loyalties were powerful.4 This long-standing Chinese 
habitual comfort in regionalism acted as the foundation for the emergence of warlord governance 
 
4 James E. Sheridan, Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yu-hsiang (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1966), 1. 
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in the 1910s -1920s. With the emergence of fractal governance and opportunity to seize power, a 
new category of military-man emerged—one that consisted of prominent military leaders who 
were equally active in politics, dujun (督军).5  
Amongst the numerous warlords who emerged in the dujun classification, a group of 
super-dujun separated themselves for their political and military acumen that situated them at the 
center of power clusters and focal point of political-military alliances.6 Three prominent warlords 
to surfacefrom the super-dujun class and shape the governance of China in this era are Feng 
Yuxiang (冯玉祥), Zhang Zuolin (张作霖), and Yan Xishan (阎锡山). Feng Yuxiang is 
nicknamed “The Christian General,” and was notable for his use of aspects of Christianity, such 
as selflessness, integrity, and devotion, as tools to consolidate support for his progressive policies 
and gain favor among the foreign missionaries within his territory.7 Yan Xishan governed over 
Shanxi Province during the Warlord Era and implemented successful reforms that earned his 
domain the title of “Model Province.”8 Zhang Zuolin and the local elite allied with him formed 
the backbone of the powerful Fengtian Clique (fengxi junfa 奉系军阀) during the Warlord Era.9 
 
5 Lucian Pye classifies the warlords of the period into three categories: localized field commanders with a 
limited support base; prominent military commanders who were also heavily involved in politics (tuchun/dujun) (督
军); and national political figureheads with a military following. See Warlord Politics, 41-43. 
 
6 Lucian Pye, Warlord Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Modernization of Republican China (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), 42. 
 
7 Due to his shifting allegiances and military post constantly being repositioned throughout the Warlord 
Era, Feng Yuxiang established political and governmental control in multiple regions of China at different junctures 
of the period. The following locations where Feng was stationed for a period allowed him to have an influence on 
governing policies: Hebei Province (1916-1917), Hunan Province (1918-1922), Beijing (1923-1924), Northwest 
Hebei, Gansu, and inner Mongolia provinces (1925-1928). 
 
8 Donald G. Gillin, Warlord: Yen His-shan in Shansi Province 1911-1949 (Princeton University Press, 
1967), 22.  
 
9 The Fengtian Clique (fengxi junfa 奉系军阀) was a political-military faction that was influential not only 
in Manchuria, but also in China Proper from 1916-1928. 
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Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian Clique seized the opportunity to engage in the political, social, 
and economic struggles during this period to build a progressive authoritarian regime in 
Northeast China and successfully govern over the vast region of Manchuria.10   
 
 
 
  
 
  Feng Yuxiang (冯玉祥)11  Yan Xishan (阎锡山)12          Zhang Zuolin (张作霖)13 
 
These three warlords14 governed over vastly different regions of China and had to each 
overcome unique factors linked to geography, population size, and political allegiances. In 
addition, due to the evolving military developments throughout the era,15 the power and 
 
10 Dating back to the 17th century, Manchuria has been used as an exonym to describe several large 
overlapping historical and geographic regions in Northeast Asia. The three northern most provinces of Northeast 
China that make up Manchuria during the Warlord Era are: Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning. 
 
11 Sheridan, Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yu-hsiang, 250-251 (fig.5). 
 
12 Gillin, Warlord: Yen His-shan in Shansi Province 1911-1949, 64-65 (fig.2). 
 
13 Gavan McCormack, Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China, 1911-1928 China, Japan, and the Manchurian 
Idea. 
 
14 The term “Warlord” carries a negative connotation and is often used to suggest a confusing, fractal, and 
destructive period. Specialized scholars focusing on the subject, such as Edward McCord and Arthur Waldron, have 
suggested substituting the terms “militarist” and “militarism” for “warlord” and “warlordism” in order to provide a 
more neutral framework in observing the individuals of this era. However, for the purpose of this paper, I will use 
the terms of “warlord” and “warlordism” in order to maintain continuity with the historical sources being analyzed 
that use these terms. 
 
15 Although the Warlord Era lasted from 1916-1928, the base of power and location of military battles 
shifted throughout the twelve year period. The overarching periods of influence can be understood as: Duan Qirui 
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influence of these three warlords power and influence reached their apex at varying times, 
further complicating the situational circumstances they needed to navigate. They each, however, 
deployed similar displays of military strength and methods of public appeal in order to 
implement their social reforms over their respective populations. In past discourse, scholars such 
as Lucian Pye constructed paradigms that argued warlords’ ideologies were restrictive and 
incapable of implementing any changes outside of their own political survival and interests. 
Evidence suggests, however, that the three particular warlords, Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, and 
Zhang Zuolin, all complicate oversimplified claims such as Pye’s because these three individuals 
attempted progressive social reforms that transcended their own personal and political 
motivations. By observing the specific public works, social reforms, and popular support 
techniques implemented by these three warlords, we can better understand that these individuals 
made significant contributions that were driven by complex, thoughtful ideologies. While it is 
true that they sometimes drew from these ideologies to reach their own political aims, the 
assertion here is that their intelligent grasp of cultural and religious value systems allowed them 
to be effective leaders. As such, these complicated figures cannot be described through typical 
scholarly notions that emphasize chaotic and selfish warlord governance.   
 
The Common View and Shifting Warlord Governance 
Modern China, like many other nation-states today, was formed chiefly by war. As 
Arthur Waldron notes, “War is a powerful and capricious historical actor” that rarely follows the 
 
(段祺瑞) and Anhui clique control (1916–20); Cao Kun (曹锟) and Zhili clique control (1920–24); Zhang Zuolin 
(张作霖) and Fengtian clique control (1924–28). I have categorized the era into these three periods with centralized 
focus on North China because the three warlords observed in this research all ruled in northern regions.  
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contours of economic, social, or intellectual developments.16 Understanding the significance of 
military paradigms becomes crucial to understanding the “Warlord Era” because of their 
widespread influence on the construction, organization, and governance of certain warlord’s 
armies and governing bodies. From 1970 to 1980, a trend emerged where scholars in the West, 
such as Anthony B. Chan and His-sheng Chi,17concentrated on various warlords and their large-
scale political struggles to form a new national identity. In their macro-sized approach to 
defining warlordism and the Warlord Era, they clustered warlords largely as a single thinking 
and acting entity. These scholars primarily emphasized that any action or ideology of one 
warlord was reflective of the greater whole. After this decade, however, the studies seems to go 
dormant and unexplored until the late 1990s when scholars like McCord and Waldron18 shift the 
focus toward the military tactics of certain warlords in a framework of overarching Chinese 
military history.  
Two schools of thought emerged between scholars about where to place significance in 
defining the warlords that comprised the Warlord Era.  The most notable disparity between the 
two schools is where the superlative value of analyzing the warlords should be positioned. On 
one hand, a micro-approach asserts that individual warlord’s actions are autonomous but capable 
 
16 Arthur Waldron, From War to Nationalism: China's Turning Point, 1924-1925 (Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), 8.  
 
17 Anthony B. Chan’s research in “Social Change and Political Legitimacy in Warlord China” and Chi His-
sheng’s Warlord Politics in China, 1916-1928 serve as pivotal examples of scholarly work in the late 1970s that 
sought to synthesize a generic framework for warlord’s ideologies that provide as contrast to the previous Confucian 
elements of imperial China.  
 
18 Sources on the topic by Arthur Waldron— From War to Nationalism: China's Turning Point, 1924-1925 
and “The Warlord: Twentieth-Century Chinese Understandings of Violence, Militarism, and Imperialism”—as well 
as Edward McCord’s The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism, serve as foundational 
research into Modern Chinese Military History. The scholars emphasize China’s ongoing military struggles in the 
early twentieth century, particularly during the Warlord Era, as a means of highlighting the uncertainties from the 
warlords heavily influenced later developments in China’s military pre-WWII.  
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of reflecting greater warlord frameworks. On the other hand, a macro-approach proposes that 
warlords’ actions should be seen in relation to one another and are interconnected in one 
framework. In contrast to scholars such as Chan and Chi’s macro approach, the 1970s scholars 
James E. Sheridan, Donald G. Gillin, and Gavan McCormack19 take a more micro, or 
individualized approach, focusing their biographical studies on individual warlords, such as Feng 
Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, and Zhang Zuolin, to provide portraits that help create a general 
framework of organized warlord governance. 
Previous scholars have conducted in depth research that is valuable in understanding the 
logic of and power struggles between major warlords. Foundational works, such as Lucian Pye’s 
Warlord Politics20 (1971), contribute compelling and insightful analysis of the numerous 
personalities of the period and the power relationships formed between them. Lucian Pye was 
notably making his research analysis on warlord governance at a time when the fate of China 
was being decided by military means. As a result of the Communist Party’s ultimate success and 
Republican government’s conclusive collapse at the time of his research, Pye’s framework is 
understandable, as it may have been difficult to imagine contributions by warlords as possibly 
existing outside of military means and temporal attempts to maintain power.  
Scholarly attention from the 1970s and 80s was shaped by a Cold War way of thinking in 
regards to Chinese history and, as a result, the role of militarism in Chinese politics became 
 
19 Works by James E. Sheridan: Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yu-hsiang, Donald G. Gillin: 
Warlord: Yen His-shan in Shansi Province 1911-1949, and Gavan McCormack Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China, 
1911-1928 China, Japan, and the Manchurian Idea, serve as examples of analysis of the individual warlord’s 
ideologies and backgrounds in order to, as Sheridan phrases it, “bring out the warlord character” (Quote from, 
Chinese Warlord, p. viii.) 
 
20 Lucian Pye’s Warlord Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Modernization of Republican China is a 
1971 work that is considered to be a foundational analytical survey of warlord ideology, largely shaping the works 
of future scholars in the field. Pye uses a logical approach and focuses on the power struggles between warlords, 
their organizational bases, coalition forming, and methods of maintaining a balance of power with a portrayal of the 
warlords as occupying a world of all against all and endlessly seeking of power.  
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paramount to understanding the Chinese Communist Party. Analysis of China in the early 
twentieth-century focused briefly on the Warlord Era, and solely on factors pertaining to 
warlords’ military maneuvers and politics such as alliances, military resources, and finances. 
While the approach of this discourse provides important context and has scholarly value, it 
largely ignores the complicated realities of warlord governance, leaving behind an unexplored 
gap regarding the social reforms they administered. Edward McCord describes Western 
historians of the warlords as seemingly “disconcerted by the difficulty in finding meaning in the 
constant civil wars and complicated political maneuvers that characterized the warlord period.”21 
The gap in discourse has led to some Western scholars relying on pre-existing analytic 
frameworks centralized around warlord politics, such as Pye’s, which rest on the presupposition 
that warlord governance is selfish, chaotic, and violent.  
Historians of China today have inherited this preexisting framework and have similarly 
insisted on maintaining the idea that warlord governance simply embodies a rejection of 
authority and is self-serving. According to McCord, “In Chinese, the word warlord junfa (军
阀)22 has a particularly pejorative connotation.” McCord continues to state that historically, the 
use of the term junfa “has resulted in attempts to distinguish, often on the basis of political 
criteria, between bad ‘warlords’ and good ‘military commanders.’”23 McCord further observes 
that Chinese scholars studying “China’s modern history have often been more reluctant to 
 
21 McCord, The Power of the Gun, 2. 
 
22 For an analysis of the evolution of the term junfa as a pejorative within Putonghua, see Arthur Waldron, 
“The Warlord: Twentieth Century Chinese Understandings of Violence, Militarism, and Imperialism,” American 
Historical Review 96, No.4, (1991): 1073-1100.  
 
23 McCord, The Power of the Gun, 3. One example of bad “warlord” being invoked would be historical 
criticisms of Zhang Zuolin, whereas good “military man” would be reserved for individuals of the same era such as 
Mao Zedong (毛泽东).  
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acknowledge the political importance of military power in the founding and survival of China's 
Communist government. Explanations of the Communist Party's political strength have usually 
paid more attention to ideological or organizational factors than to the control and application of 
armed force.”24 This Chinese scholarly historical analysis resonates with Mao Zedong’s 
dismissal of the Warlord Era and critique of the warlords as seeking a capitalist economy by 
means of Western imperialist policies of “division and exploitation by marking off spheres of 
influence.”25 In contrast to the straightforward condemnation of these warlords, my project 
asserts that each of the three warlords—through their effective methods and attempts at 
progressive reforms as part of a larger transitional approach to governance in China—helped to 
lay the foundation for later Chinese government structure under the Nationalist movement, and 
ultimately, the Communist Party.  
Indeed, since the 1990s, due to the concentration and focus by these scholars on military 
and political motivations, a large vacancy emerges: observation of the interaction between 
warlords and social institutions. The gap left behind by these scholarly works is where I assert 
my research, which is supported by more current scholars. Foundational scholarly works have 
served as exemplary models in creating simple black and white configurations of warlord 
governance that’s serve as helpful starting points. This research aims to analyze the similar 
methods deployed by three prominent warlords’ progressive ideologies and execution of social 
policies in their respective regions, as a means of providing further color and detail to these 
pictures. 
 
 
 
24 McCord, 1. 
 
25 McCord, 7.  
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Changing Political Fortunes: Power and Ideological Transitions 
Lucian Pye’s lauded analysis in his book Warlord Politics contends that the warlords 
were compelled to govern without any overlying moral or social ideology, but rather through 
pragmatic short-term policy decisions that were sensitive to threats to their organization and 
bases of power. Pye argues that the warlords were incapable of ideological reformation in 
Chinese society and implementing durable social reforms because “Their behavior was 
controlled too much by the nature and distribution of power in the Chinese society of that era to 
have been greatly influenced by values and objectives unrelated to the requirements of political 
survival.”26 By arguing that warlords only attempted to establish small areas of differentiation 
from others, Pye implies their ideologies and actions were informed by a common objective: to  
not be isolated from other leaders. He asserts “No leader was strong enough to champion great 
causes and any attempt in such a direction would establish him as a foe of all the other 
tuchuns.”27 The emphasis Pye places on warlords’ inability to challenge the status quo of the 
political situations at hand validates his argument that they were utterly incapable of identifying 
with issues that were meaningful to the people. 
Although Pye’s framework provides an insightful theoretical approach to analyzing 
warlord governance as a product of power struggle, there are significant limitations in his 
exclusion of crucial factors within his framework. The absence of these human and cultural 
factors shaping individual warlords’ actions in Pye’s analysis overlooks the unique 
circumstances each warlord faced. This oversimplification of warlord ideology as a pursuit for 
survival and departure from the old, stable, uniform society muddies the waters about the 
 
26 Pye, Warlord Politics, 167. 
 
27 Pye, 129.  
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significant role played by certain warlords in transitioning Chinese society through social 
reforms into a more progressive political landscape.  
Twenty-first century scholarly discourse on the Republican and Warlord Eras of Chinese 
history contains a wealth of sources available outside the Cold War method of thinking implored 
by previous scholars. Drawing from these more modern sources, the social reforms discussed in 
the next section of this paper display that warlords such as Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, and 
Zhang Zuolin harbored visions for their governance that move far beyond motives of personal 
survival and political acclaim as depicted by Pye. In order to highlight these social reform 
developments, first we must understand the massive social hierarchical and ideological transition 
that occurred in the early twentieth century and how it shaped the policy aims of these warlords.  
 
Uprooting Confucianism, Replanting its Values 
 Pye’s framework presumes that warlords are incapable of governing with social or moral 
ideologies and rely on pragmatism in order to survive and maintain their power bases. However, 
the cases of Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, and Zhang Zuolin, show that they possessed a capacity 
to develop their own personal ideologies from traditional Chinese sources. The greatest 
traditional Chinese construct that influenced and molded these warlords’ governance strategies 
was that of Confucianism. 
Since the Han Dynasty (221-206 B.C.), Confucianism has been ingrained into the fabric 
of Chinese civilization. As the prevailing ideology, advocates of Confucianism assumed integral 
societal positions as government officials, civil servants, and gentry. In imperial China the 
emperor wielded political authority, but the Confucian intellectuals can be considered as the 
14 
 
stewards of Chinese society. During the Tang Dynasty (618-906 A.D.) the imperial examination 
system, keju (科举) was established. The keju tested an individual’s mastery of the Confucian 
classics, and, as a result, the highest political positions of power were reserved for the Confucian 
scholars. The keju system provided an effective source of scholars prescribing to the same 
ideology that would perpetuate Confucianism’s elite status.  
 Traditional class social structure placed the Confucian scholars at its pinnacle. This 
socio-political status was derived from Confucian teachings of Mencius (mengzi 孟子) and his 
interpretations of the “natural inequalities of man”: 
Some work with their hearts-and-minds, others with their muscles. Those who 
work with their hearts-and-minds maintain order for others; those who work with 
their muscles have order maintained by others. Those whose order is maintained 
by others provide the food; those who maintain order among others receive food. 
Such is the propriety that is general throughout the world.28 
 
In traditional Chinese society there had always been powerful and cultural forces at work 
to discourage people from joining the military profession. Such sayings as “Good iron should not 
be used to make nails,”29 “Good men should not become soldiers” were entrenched in Chinese 
society.30 Although every new dynasty was established by military force and emperors relied on 
their armies for legitimacy, Confucian interpretations of government insisted that soldiers were 
insignificant and ranked near the bottom of the social scale.31 
 
28 Mencius, The Sayings of Mencius, trans. by James R. Ware, 55.  
 
29 The Chinese characters for the saying read “好铁不打定，好汉不当兵” (“Hao tie bu da ding, haohan 
budang bing”) 
 
30 Chi Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-1928 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 79.  
 
31 Pye, Warlord Politics, 3. 
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The Qing dynasties’ (1644-1912) humiliating defeats at the hands of the Japanese in 1895 
and Boxer Rebellion (1900) led to imperial recognition of the need for militarism in Chinese 
society. In 1905, the traditional keju examination system was abolished and Chinese society fell 
into a state of political uncertainty. Anthony B. Chan describes this political turning point: “With 
the traditional avenue of political power effectively closed, many members of the gentry class 
who previously would have looked to military through the scholar-official class now looked to 
military service for upward mobility. Many sons of the gentry, in effect, were attracted by the 
expanding prestige and influence of military academies.”32 The sudden acknowledgement of the 
military as a respectable profession presented an upheaval to the traditional social ideology and 
created a vacuum for military men to seek new forms of legitimacy.  
The newly elevated recognition of warlords induced more individuals into military 
service, largely because it seemed to provide the most accessible road to political prominence. 
However, despite the departure of political and social power from Confucian bureaucrats, 
warlords and military-men alike were still required to legitimize their status as the new 
predominant political elite. Confucianism’s philosophical influence on the social and political 
hierarchies of Chinse society for centuries positioned it as a prefabricated tool for warlords to 
cultivate their personal political goals.33 Similar to the popularized interpretations of the 
venerable sages used to create Neo-Confucianism centuries earlier by Zhu Xi34 朱熹 (1130–
 
32 Anthony B. Chan, “Social Change and Political Legitimacy in Warlord China,” Asian Studies Journal, 
11:1 (1972): 157.  
 
33 Chan, 159-160.  
 
34 Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) was a Song dynasty philosopher, politician, and Confucian scholar. He 
founded the “rationalist” school (lixue 理學) and is noted as being the most influential Neo-Confucian scholar. His 
philosophy included his commentaries on the four books: the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, the 
Analects of Confucius, and the Mencius as the core curriculum for the later formed Civil Service Examination 
system (keju). 
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1200), the newly constructed Warlord-Confucianism35 synthesized various elements of the 
distant past in order to validate its military presence.36 
 Unlike the traditional Confucian scholars of imperial China, the Warlords who would 
champion Confucian elements into their ideologies learned core precepts of Confucianism 
through methods other than memorizing ancient classics. Jerome Chen notes that instead, the 
warlords became conversant with Confucian teachings “not from the classics and sutras, but 
from popular novels, operas, story-telling, and so on.”37 This nuanced interaction with the ideas 
and morals preached through Confucianism left an impression on warlords that there was room 
for interpretation of its core virtues with their own individualized worldviews.38 Feng Yuxiang, 
Yan Xishan, and Zhang Zuolin are all examples of men who believed China’s problems could 
only be solved through the moral rehabilitation of its people. Confucianism, in their 
interpretations, existed “as a historically effective means of inculcating respect for authority” and 
that their governance sought moral guidance of “the people” through virtue.39 
Perhaps the most integral component of both traditional Confucianism and the newly 
formed Warlord-Confucianism is references to governing on behalf of “the people.” Passages 
written in the Shujing40 (“Classic of History”) emphasize “the people” in such ways – “heaven 
 
35 For more detail on the structure and tenants that constituted Warlord-Confucianism, see Anthony B. 
Chan. “Social Change and Political Legitimacy in Warlord China” (1972). 
 
36 Chan, 159.  
 
37 Jerome Ch’en, “Defining Chinese Warlords and Their Factions,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and 
African Studies, University of London, vol. 31:3 (1968): 569.  
 
38 The humanism focus of Confucianism emphasizes five specific virtues because they are believed to be 
manifestations of humanity’s sacred moral nature, xing (性): benevolence, Ren (仁); Righteousness, Yi (义; 義); 
Proper rite, Li (礼; 禮); Knowledge, Zhi (智); and Integrity, Xin (信). 
 
39 Gillin, Warlord: Yen His-shan in Shansi Province 1911-1949, 59. 
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sees as the people see [and] hears as the people hear” (11:10); “The common people are the root 
or foundation of a society” (6:3). These are only a few examples of the numerous Confucian 
teachings promoting benevolent rulership referenced by Mencius that enjoined princes of 
imperial China to cultivate moral power instead of relying on force and intrigue. In traditional 
Confucian ideology, the responsibility of governing that came with the Mandate of Heaven was 
to govern on behalf of the people and to their benefit. Thus, Confucianism established the 
societal norm that a government’s authority and validity rested in the hands of the people.  
 During the Warlord Era, warlords would often invoke Confucianism edicts justifying 
their actions in the name of “the people” to provide a sense of traditional legitimacy to their 
reforms. One example of warlord governance invoking “the people” can be seen in Zhang 
Zuolin’s 1924 justification of going to war with Wu Peifu and the Beijing government:  
…Ts'ao K'un and Wu P'ei-fu with' their minds perverted are more than ever bent 
upon showing their ferocious fangs…Peking destroys what the people hope to set 
up, namely the self-government system; Peking tramples what the whole nation is 
praying to secure, viz: peace.41  
Zhang follows his condemnation of their behavior and lack of moral virtue with the declaration:  
“Since public opinion is unanimously opposed to the continuation of such wicked 
regime, I, Tso-lin for the sake of our nation and our people feel it my bounden 
duty to lead my army and swear to rid the country of the people’s traitors ....”42  
 
Superficially, justification of such military actions in the interests and benefit of “the people” 
held prospects of short-term political gains. Many prominent warlords came from uneducated 
 
40 The Book of Documents, Shujing (书经), is one of the Five Classics of ancient Chinese literature. This 
collection of dialogues and quotations of figures of ancient China has served as the cornerstone of political 
philosophy in China for 2,000 years.  
 
41 Chan, “Social Change and Political Legitimacy in Warlord China,” 162.  
 
42  See note 41 above. 
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and impoverished backgrounds, creating a stigma amongst the more politically elite that their 
harsh backgrounds delegitimized them from political participation. In order to seize political 
legitimacy, especially in the view of the people, individuals such as Zhang Zuolin would rely on 
Confucianism as a means of moral condemnation of those opposing their governance. 
Condemning the opposition as not having the interests of “the people,” and claiming they 
championed the public’s best interests, the warlords used these oblique methods to enhance their 
political prestige amongst their constituents. Despite the short-term political capital gained by 
invoking Confucianism amongst warlord peers, more authentic aspects of the ideology presented 
themselves in the implementation of governing policies toward the citizenry.  
Warlord governance entailed a continuous balancing of the superficial and authentic 
Confucian elements comprising their ideologies. At the center of the ideologies of warlords who 
drew from Confucianism were the core concepts of social harmony, respect for authority, and 
interests of the people. A grounded understanding of the use of these core principles is a vital 
component in understanding a more holistic, in-depth portrait of who the warlords were, and 
what shaped their motivations. 
 
Individualizing Confucian Principles for Personal Ideologies 
Outside of justification for certain military actions and morally condemnation of 
opponents for political prestige, certain warlords managed to uphold high standards of certain 
Confucian doctrines they adopted into their governing strategies. The foundation provided by 
Confucianism and the Chinese populations’ familiarity with it allowed ample opportunity for the 
warlords’ ideologies to flourish, in the hopes of forging a new governing identity. Although 
coming from unique social backgrounds and upbringings, Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, and 
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Zhang Zuolin all exemplified the unification of old Confucian values with new warlord 
ideological governing strategies.  
Feng Yuxiang was a unique warlord of this period in that his ideological motivations in 
his system of governance and reform were derived from Confucian values he synthesized with 
his faith in Christianity. Feng Yuxiang is generally known as the “Christian General” because of 
the emphasis he placed on Christianity being a moral beacon to bring about public order. One 
aspect of Feng’s reputation as a positive reformist and who effectively governed over a 
constructive civil administration was his conversion to Christianity. Feng is believed to have 
accepted Christianity on the grounds that its adherents exemplified social practices and 
individual virtues that Feng thought commendable.43 Feng observed that the Christians “did not 
smoke opium; whether poor or rich, they saw to it their children were educated; there were no 
idlers among them; and Christian women did not bind their feet.”44 Feng wrote: 
These few simple points, elicited my extraordinary admiration. At the time [about 
1912-14] I thought that if all the people of China could act in a similar fashion, 
the nation would gradually find a way, and society would indeed gradually 
improve.45 
 
Feng Yuxiang’s observations of the prospects of Christianity on individuals’ behavior and strict 
adherence to its moral guidelines influenced his belief in the religion as a possible long-term path 
to social harmony. Although Feng never forced citizens to convert to Christianity, his modeling 
of its virtues and promulgation of the benefits of his own conversion encouraged people to 
 
43 Sheridan, Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yu-hsiang , 54.  
 
44 Sheridan, 53. 
 
45 Feng, Yuxiang, Wo de Shenghuo: Feng Yuxiang Zizhuan (PLA Literature and Art Publishing House, 
2002), 367-68.  
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follow suit. However Feng viewed the long-term benefits on society, he appeared to be more 
concerned with what Christians did, not what they thought. James Sheridan describes Feng 
Yuxiang’s concern with Christian doctrine as seldom going beyond moral platitudes that had as 
much Confucianism as Christianity in them.46 Moral vigor and upstanding principles such as 
selflessness, integrity, and knowledge were at the heart of his “moral education” he sought to 
provide the people. In 1915, distributed amongst his men, was a booklet Feng wrote entitled The 
Book of the Spirit, jingshen shu (精神书). One chapter, “The Spirit of Morality” emphasized the 
cultivation of personal character and key Confucian principles by urging the reader to be serious 
in speech, cautious in action, diligent in study.47 Feng’s aims appear to be a balancing of 
superficial Christian religious practices to encourage short-term coercion with long-term benefits 
of a morally cohesive society. Feng aimed to channel principles of Confucianism through the 
package of Christianity, in order to assert to his soldiers, and governed population, sentiments 
such as “Sacrifice of one’s own small self is the principle of humanity (ren 仁) and righteousness 
(yi 义).”48 
Another warlord forging their own ideology through the adoption of Confucian tenants 
was Yan Xishan. In the Warlord Era, Shanxi province gained the moniker The Model Province, 
making Yan Xishan its Model Governor. Donald Gillin describes Yan Xishan’s newly styled 
governing strategy as capturing the ideal of Confucianism because his reforms and behavior 
“were offered in a spirit of noblesse oblige and with the intention of demonstrating to all that the 
 
46 See note 43 above.  
 
47 Sheridan, 80.  
 
48 Feng, Yuxiang, Wo de Shenghuo: Feng Yuxiang Zizhuan, 227. Ch’eng, 9-11, quotes or paraphrases over 
twenty of the sayings from Feng’s booklet.  
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Model Governor was a chun-tzu (junzi 君子) or ‘superior man’ and thus the epitome of virtue 
from the Confucian point of view.”49 Yan Xishan was able to endure the military and political 
minefield around his province, and maintain political control of Shanxi province from 1911 until 
1949, long outlasting the Warlord Era itself. Despite its proximity to the capital of Beijing in 
Northern China, Shanxi province is very isolated from its neighboring provinces. Shanxi’s high 
rising plateau and incredibly mountainous terrain largely shaped Yan Xishan’s governing 
ideology. He interpreted the realities of Shanxi’s isolation, both internally and externally, as 
incentives to pursue reforms targeting rapid modernization and emphasizing grassroots local 
governance. Due to this epiphany and need for localized focus, Yan Xishan particularly 
borrowed from Confucian tenants emphasizing individual’s accountability to bettering their 
communities. He would inculcate his subjects with ideas “that each of them possessed an innate 
capacity for goodness, but in order to fulfill this capacity they must subordinate their emotions 
and desires, ganzhi (感知) to the dictates of conscious, liangzhi (良知).”50 He adopted this 
Confucian concept of liangzhi into his own governing policy to suggest his assertive and 
invasive reforms into people’s daily lives were to help his subjects’ morality flourish. In Yan 
Xishan’s worldview, Confucian doctrine “held that men could suppress evil desires and attain 
perfection only by means of intense self-criticism and self-cultivation.”51 Sentiment that was 
reflected in many of Yan’s hard-lined policy reforms, which can be interpreted as overbearing on 
people’s lives, provided opportunities for them to rapidly modernize, both morally and socially.  
 
49 Gillin, Warlord: Yen His-shan in Shansi Province 1911-1949, 59.  
 
50 Gillin, 60.  
 
51 See note 50 above.   
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Zhang Zuolin faced unique circumstances from the other two warlords mentioned, and 
these largely shaped the geographical and social limits of certain policies he attempted. Zhang 
ruled over Northeast China’s Manchuria and, as a result, was surrounded by hostile internal 
opponents such as Feng Yuxiang, Wu Peifu, and Cao Kun, as well as external foreign threats 
from Russia, Japan, and most western powers of the time. Whereas a warlord like Yan Xishan 
needed to adapt to the isolated nature of his governed region, Zhang Zuolin needed to adapt to 
the multilateral politics and copious individual interests in his region. Kwong Chiman states it is 
“because of this complex geopolitical situation that Zhang was always cautious in his 
intervention in Chinese politics and sensitive to the international dimension of his governing 
actions.”52 Zhang Zuolin was convinced that China’s problem was the result of external 
encroachment and internal moral decline, and tried to play on these two themes to enhance his 
political authority.53 Zhang relied on Confucian elements in order to establish his ideology as a 
form of cultural conservatism designed to promote tradition and upstanding morals. He proposed 
components of his Warlord-Confucianism would accomplish the goals of his moral rhetoric by 
promising to “punish the greedy ones, promote honesty, encourage creativity, and ensure 
cooperation between capital and labor.”54 He also argued for the vital nature of social order as 
the catalyst for the eradication of “classes” in China as all people should be equally protected by 
the government. In Confucian nature, Zhang Zuolin strongly believed order would naturally 
follow if the people “cooperated and played their appropriate roles in the society.”55 He 
 
52 Kwong Chiman, War and Geopolitics in Interwar Manchuria Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian Clique 
during the Northern Expedition (Brill, 2017), 89. 
 
53 Kwong, 89.  
 
54 “ChangTso-lin’s Policy,” Week In China (Peiking), Vol.8,  No.100, 11-2. 
 
55 “San tulunhui kaimo,” Guowen Weekly (Shanghai, Tianjin), Vol.4, No.5, 9-10. 
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emphasized in his personal ideology, like Confucianism, that social order would best be achieved 
if its members learned to subdue themselves to the benevolence of the overseeing governing 
body. 
 All three of these warlord’s ideologies present varied adaptions of old imperial Confucian 
principles, especially on moral guidance, into their personal ideologies of the time. Contrary to 
Pye’s assessment that Warlords’ behavior was uninfluenced by values and personal moral 
judgments, these three warlords demonstrate capacity to develop their own personal ideologies 
from pre-existing societal notions from sources such as Confucianism. By drawing on Confucian 
values and synthesizing them into personal ideologies, these warlords at worst, saw the linkage 
between the use ideology and effective political leadership and, at best, aligned their morally and 
progressive social mindsets with their policies and reforms. In the next section, I discuss the 
specific policy contributions of these warlords through their public works, social reforms, and 
moral stewardship that emerged from their visionary ideologies and effective leadership.  
 
Seeing the Bigger Picture 
Discourse following Pye’s reasoning constitutes that because warlords are merely 
concerned with navigating the short-term threats of the period, they are incapable of identifying 
long-term socially relevant issues that serve the interests of the people they governed. In this line 
of thinking, factors such as alliances, military resources, and finances confined warlords to 
ephemeral policies, and obscured their view of the bigger picture. From this perspective, one 
would assume the short-mindedness of their governance prevented them from enacting 
progressive social reforms. However, we see in the cases of Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, and 
Zhang Zuolin that even in a country inured with corruption and governance at times more 
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concerned with living hand to mouth, leaders with constructive reforms and civil authority were 
not absent.56 
 
Public Works 
The first area of major reform by these three warlords was their commitment to public 
works projects designed to energize the regional economies and best position them to assist the 
people in long-term modernization. The most visible projects were represented through 
ambitious infrastructure construction that was designed to unite their respective regions and 
allow rapid flow of resources. Of the three warlords discussed, Feng Yuxiang was most notable 
for using his own troops on construction projects that would at times involve repairing city walls, 
diverting river banks to provide cleaner drinking water, and widening and repairing roads.57 In 
the case of Feng Yuxiang, throughout the Warlord Era he was stationed in multiple regions 
ranging from Central China’s Hunan province to Northwest China’s Gansu and Inner Mongolia 
provinces.58 Despite this constant repositioning, he maintained similar ambitions to modernize 
the regions in which he governed. While situated in Northwest China, he placed a heavy 
emphasis on construction projects aimed toward economic development that would provide 
 
56 At the time of writing and conducting this research, the Covid-19 disease global pandemic has effectively 
shut down all businesses and institutions. Library resources for this paper as a result were limited to digital sources 
and prior research before the outbreak. With little to no access to primary source materials, many of the citations in 
the next three sections on specific warlord policies have been relegated to the secondary scholarly sources and use of 
them in the footnote section. In future research I will gain access to the primary sources for more accurate first-hand 
interpretations. 
 
57 Sheridan, Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yu-hsiang, 92. 
 
58 Unlike the other two warlords in this research who maintained the same power bases throughout the 
Warlord Era, Feng Yuxiang was stationed and moved around multiple times due to his constant changing alliances. 
Although this movement hindered the long-term success of his policies, he would utilize similar methods of 
governance wherever he was positioned.  
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transportation facilities capable of connecting trade from the people to distant lands. One of his 
most ambitious projects was the construction of a 400-mile motor road from the city of Baotou in 
Inner Mongolia to Ningxia province.59 This project effectively linked the long-isolated 
Northwestern China regions to major trade posts and cities along the Silk Road. It also served as 
foundation for more ambitious goals such as Feng Yuxiang’s five-year colonization scheme 
designed to lure millions of poor peasants to the Northwest from the overcrowded Eastern 
regions of Zhili, Shandong, Anhui provinces.60 Although construction projects such as these can 
be considered modest in achievement, their core purpose was to better the community and reflect 
the commitment to public service and represented the warlords’ ideal of prosperous governance. 
Another public works category these warlords all addressed with zeal was their 
commitment to reform the education systems of their regions. Unlike the more visible 
construction projects that could yield immediate economic results, educational reforms were 
designed to have a long-term generational impact and solidify the power bases of the warlords. 
Universal education, literacy, and vocational training would become pivotal components to the 
reforms. When Yan Xishan took over as governor of Shanxi province in 1911, the population 
had an alarmingly low literacy rate. Yan Xishan, like many warlords, relied on newspapers and 
other written material to communicate and distribute his ideology. When he became governor, 
 
59 The 400-mile road was formally opened September 30, 1925. Five months after its completion, the road 
was extended to Eastern Gansu Province. The road played an intricate role in connecting the isolated Northwest of 
China to Central China’s major trade cities. For more details see (Sheridan, 153). It also served as a foundation for 
Feng Yuxiang’s more ambitious goal of development of agriculture and industry to make the region self-supporting 
and capable of large revenues. 
 
60 At the start of his project, the aim was to have 50 villages built, where each village could house upwards 
of 200 families, and provide each family with sufficient land to farm. An agriculture bank would furnish newcomers 
with capital and fair loans needed to purchase land, tools, livestock. Feng envisioned these villages to become self-
contained communities, not unlike contemporary American suburban housing developments. In the end like most of 
Feng’s projects, due to another war breaking out in 1925, Feng’s plan could not be implemented to scale to greatly 
impact the population or economy of region. (For details see Sheridan, 151-152).  
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more than 99 percent of Shanxi’s 11 million inhabitants could neither read nor write.61 In order 
to eradicate such conditions, Yan Xishan insisted children in his domain attend school for a 
minimum of four years.62 The result from this universal education policy was that by 1923 there 
was an estimated 800,000 children receiving some kind of education. This figure was a 
significantly larger number than the reported number of children attending primary school in any 
other province at the time.63 In line with his emphasis on providing drastic educational reform to 
promote literacy, Feng Yuxiang established a “School for the Masses” program that deployed 
government officials as teachers and young students into the streets to gather in groups for 
instruction in elementary reading.64 Feng would go as far as designating punishments in the form 
of fines and imprisonment for those that refused to study.65 Zhang Zuolin shared sentiments of 
providing widespread education to the masses and built off previous Qing dynasty projects 
aimed at funneling resources into modernizing Manchuria’s educational system. Under Zhang’s 
leadership between the 1910s to 1931, the number of schools in his domain increased to 10,404 
(including 4 universities, 271 high schools, and10,101 elementary schools).66 
One of the prevailing issues confronted by warlords and governance during the Warlord 
Era was the presence of banditry. Banditry would become a viable survival means in war-torn 
 
61 Gillin, Warlord: Yen His-shan in Shansi Province 1911-1949, 67. 
 
62 See note 61 above.   
 
63 Gillin, 67. A few of Yan Xishan’s biggest critics hostile toward his governance, such as Wang Chen-I, 
admitted that between 1917 and 1919 the number of children attending school in Shanxi rose 300 percent to 
1,035,356. See Wang Chen-I, 8.  
 
64 Sheridan, Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yu-hsiang, 159.  
 
65 See note 64 above.  
 
66 Guo Jianping, Fengxi jiaoyu (Shenyang: Liaohaichubanshe, 2000), 298.  
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times for those desperate enough to forcibly acquire resources they felt certain governing bodies 
were reluctant to supply. In order to combat the incentives that might incline people to engage in 
banditry, educational reforms by these warlords placed an emphasis on providing vocational 
training. In Shanxi province, Yan Xishan built more than 26,000 people’s schools (guomin 
xuexiao 国民学校)67 and spent exorbitantly to outfit them with modern amenities.68 Yan aimed 
to design the schools to be as practical as possible and assigned vocational training as curriculum 
on subjects like sericulture, animal husbandry, and manufacturing pottery, furniture, clothes.69 
Similar to how Yan encouraged soldiers to learn a trade skill, he foresaw that children also 
gaining these skills would be less compelled to turn to banditry as a livelihood.70 To fulfill this 
aspiration, Yan made the ambitious reform of providing tuition-free schooling for everyone. 
Although his dream of universal free primary school education ultimately failed, Yan presented a 
reform that radically departed from the traditional educational practices of past Chinese 
governments, and succeeded in drastically increasing the literate population.71 Feng Yuxiang is 
another example of a warlord who emphasized education and vocational skill training. Feng 
established numerous welfare institutions and orphanages, with a particular focus on organizing 
 
67 Yan Xishan’s educational reforms have received criticism as being less interested in education and more 
indoctrination. Critics perceived that Yan’s apparent goals of schools was to provide him with an army of trained 
farmers and workers able to read his propaganda, yet not educated enough to question it. For detail on Yan’s 
educational policies and structure, see (Gillin, 71-78). 
 
68 Gillin, Warlord: Yen His-shan in Shansi Province 1911-1949, 68. 
 
69 Gillin, 69.  
 
70 Gillin, 31. 
 
71 Some factors that led to resistance and failure of Yan’s universal free education were the lack of qualified 
teaching; no official birth records so parents could withhold students from school in order to stay home and work on 
the farm. During imperial China, particularly the Qing dynasty, traditional social order constituted that only the 
wealthy land-owning gentry received an education. Yan’s reforms of universal education received serious gentry 
intervention and pushback at the disruption to this traditional social order (Gillin, 77). Despite large scale failures, 
Yan’s educational reforms were dramatically progressive and managed to influence the regional educational system 
and thinking going forward. 
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care for war orphans and abandoned children.72 He also prioritized establishing a fund for public 
education, and the schools were frequently inspected by himself.73 He also instituted the School 
for the People, where adults with no education had the opportunity to study. Feng went as far as 
building opening recreation halls where the public was periodically invited for lectures 
personally from Feng or one of his officers.74 The priority Feng placed on his educational 
reforms was that children, from ages five to fifteen, and adults would receive an education while 
also being taught a trade or skill so they could make an honest living without turning to banditry.  
With these warlords aimed to dissuade banditry, their vocational educational reforms also 
positively impacted women and encouraged them to take a more active role in economic life. 
Due to social norms in Chinese society, women seldom took up an occupation aside form purely 
domestic duties. All three of these warlords realized the prospects of cultivating the vast 
population and potential of women in the workforce. In Shanxi province, women comprised 
nearly 25 percent of the potential labor force.75 In response, Yan Xishan erected in every district 
at least one vocational school where peasant women could become literate and learn skills such 
as weaving, spinning, and sericulture.76 The mobilization of women in the workforce that was 
facilitated by some warlords’ policies represented the early stages of the societal normalization 
of women as crucial participants toward realization of the government’s objectives. This 
sentiment later continued and was championed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 
 
72 Sheridan, Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yu-hsiang, 158. 
 
73 Feng, Yuxiang, 437. 
 
74 Sheridan, Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yu-hsiang, 105. 
 
75 Gillin, Warlord: Yen His-shan in Shansi Province 1911-1949, 34.  
 
76 See note 75 above.  
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represented by Mao’s famous political slogan “The times have changed, men and women are the 
same” (时代不同了, 男女都一样) which asserted that men and women were equal in political 
consciousness and physical strength.77  
 The final front of progressive public works reforms by these three warlords was 
inculcation and investment toward modernizing medical practices. Due to the war-torn climate of 
the era, almost every region of China in this decade faced complications with disease, famine, 
and impoverished populations. A critical factor in the exorbitant death counts of the Warlord Era 
can be attributed to insanitary and antiquated medical practices at the time.78  
Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, and Zhang Zuolin, like many other warlords, utilized 
influence from their governance in order to emphasize the vital nature of a modernized 
healthcare system to Chinese society. In addition to establishing numerous welfare institutions, 
Feng Yuxiang also placed great emphasis on homes with the facility to care for the blind, 
crippled, and elderly masses left impoverished by the wars.79 Accompanying these care facilities 
were numerous civilian health clinics personally funded by Feng and often headed by American 
missionary doctors Feng had close relations with. One example is Feng inviting the American 
missionary Dr. Charles Lewis to establish and direct a hospital Feng personally financed in 
Northwest China.80 In fact, prominent warlords who invested heavily in medical reforms often 
 
77 Yang, Wenqi. “The annihilation of femininity in Mao’s China: Gender inequality of sent-down youth 
during the Cultural Revolution,” Sage Journals vol 31, no. 1 (2017): 1.   
 
78 Due to limited records from the time, no official figures for the total death count of individuals during the 
Warlord Era exist. Projections from historian accounts estimate that from 1917-1928, over 800 thousand died from 
battle, and upwards of 6 million died from resulting non-democidal factors. (Matthew White, 
https://necrometrics.com/20c300k.htm#Warlord) 
 
79 Sheridan, Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yu-hsiang, 158.  
 
80 Sheridan, 158-59.  
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relied on foreign doctors to maintain and design these self-financed hospitals to care for 
civilians. Zhang Zuolin approached medical reform primarily for the health of his own military. 
In his view, the more healthy and capable his military was, the more he could continue to rely on 
them for enforcing his internal government reforms.81 In the aftermath of his war with Wu Peifu, 
in 1924 Zhang Zuolin founded the single largest medical facility in Manchuria, the 400-bed 
Northeastern Military Hospital (Dongbei lujun yiyuan 东北陆军医院). The hospital may have 
served a certain military strategy, but Zhang insisted the priority was to provide top quality 
routine healthcare to all its patients.82 Yan Xishan also valued the expertise and influence of 
western medical missionary doctors. In the early years of Yan Xishan’s governance, Shanxi 
experienced intense outbreaks of diphtheria, influenza, and bubonic plague, resulting in as many 
as 8,000 deaths in a single year.83 Yan Xishan was so impressed by foreign doctors’ knowledge 
and skill during the epidemic, he was inspired to build modern hospitals and medicals schools 
across the province.84  
All three warlords notably made remarks on the ineffectiveness of Traditional Chinese 
Medicine in hopes of popularizing more western medical and surgical techniques. While in cities 
these new western medical techniques were adopted, in the countryside large populations still 
patronized herbalists using traditional lore of Chinese medicine. The traditional doctors 
implemented techniques such as acupuncture and cauterization, but were often ignorant of 
 
81 On the driving factors of Zhang Zuolin’s hospital construction in Manchuria, see Gavan McCormack, 
Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China, 1911–1928: China, Japan, and the Manchurian Idea, and Suleski, Civil 
Government in Warlord China. 
 
82 DuBois, Thomas David. “Public Health and Private Charity in Northeast China, 1905–1945,” Frontiers 
of History in China, Brill vol. 9:4 (2014): 517.  
 
83 Gillin, Warlord: Yen His-shan in Shansi Province 1911-1949, 36. 
 
84 See note 83 above.   
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elementary hygiene techniques and neglected to sterilize their instruments.85 Pushback to modern 
western medicinal practices led warlords to, in masse, establish medical schools and enforce 
teaching countryside doctors the basic principles of modern medicine. The conflict and debate 
about the gains of eastern and western medicine would not subside under these warlords. 
However, their strong push for a modernized healthcare system and financial backing of medical 
education and facilities is a crucial step in encouraging Chinese doctors to blend more modern 
medical practices alongside traditional techniques.  
 
A Crusade of Social Reforms  
The second area of major reform targeted by these three warlords was their progressive 
measures designed to shape and cultivate a society in their respective spheres of influence that 
paralleled their personal ideologies. Each of these three warlords combatted unique 
circumstances in their attempt to reshape the societies and people they governed over. Despite 
each pursuing large-scale societal reconstruction in their respective regions that reflected their 
own personal ideologies, all three of them championed progressive social reforms that centered 
around effective governance and citizen participation. These measures showed an understanding 
of local needs, the importance of social stability, and kept long-term benefits of the governed 
people in mind.  
Of the three warlords discussed, Zhang Zuolin was in a particularly unique situation in 
regard to his social reforms due to the massive geographic scale of Manchuria.86 Since 
 
85 Gillin, 36.  
 
86 The three Chinese provinces (Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning) that make up Manchuria are estimated at 
380,000mi2, slightly larger than the size of the U.S. states: California, Oregon, and Washington combined.  
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Manchuria had such a diverse and massive population, Zhang focused on a grassroots localized 
approach to his social reforms. Kwong Chiman argues that without the support of the local elites 
and the military, Zhang Zuolin could hardly have survived as a local strongman, let alone the 
leader of the Chinese in Manchuria. Kwong further highlights that Zhang’s ability to enlist the 
support of the local elite distinguished him from other military leaders in Manchuria, and 
ultimately led to the preeminence of his support base.87 In order to establish and maintain 
influence in local governing bodies, Zhang enacted the reform of establishing the “meeting of 
local elders” (xianglao huiyi 乡老会议) as a local constitutional body.88 The selected “elders” 
voted with secret ballots and met with Zhang personally to comment on various issues in their 
locale—from the conduct of the officials and garrisons to infrastructure and education.89 Another 
drastic social reform by Zhang that promulgated his nonpartisan vision for Manchurian society 
was his revival of the provincial assemblies in 1918. Zhang understood his rule could not exist 
without collaboration with civilian bureaucrats, but he also required institutional consent to enact 
localized policies. Although the provincial assemblies had minimal general public participation, 
they were progressive in allowing lower bureaucratic commercial and educational interests to be 
represented and consulted by the authorities.90 In contrast to perceptions that warlords governed 
only in their own self-interest, Zhang Zuolin’s reforms inspired regional governmental 
participation of grassroots level officials. This new approach positioned Zhang to be aware and 
conscientious of the needs of local areas, as well as knowledgeable of exact quantities of 
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resources and where they needed to be allocated. Zhang prioritized reconstructing Manchurian 
society governance and participation from a bottom-up approach, with himself at the helm of all 
transactions. In effect, Zhang’s reforms and approach created a unique situation for his citizenry 
that for the first time in Chinese history, encouraged smaller localized voices to be heard on a 
regional level. By encouraging local participation, Zhang’s reforms instilled confidence in local 
elites their interests were being heard, as well as bolstered Zhang’s political position as the 
protector of the Chinese position and interests in Manchuria.  
Whereas Zhang Zuolin aimed for his social reforms to strategically position himself as 
the arbiter of preserving Manchurian interests, Feng Yuxiang’s social reforms utilized an 
ambitious moral approach toward curbing the populace into a more harmonious society. 
Christianity was foundational to Feng’s reputation as governing a reformist and constructive civil 
administration. As previously mentioned, Feng’s zealous faith in Christianity instilled in him 
values of selflessness, integrity, and devotion to development of moral vigor. These guiding 
principles were the foundation of Feng Yuxiang’s steadfast commitment to stamp out in every 
area where he governed the three vices he labeled as corruptors of people’s souls: narcotics, 
gambling, and prostitution.91 James E. Sheridan explains “Feng was strongly opposed to 
narcotics by temperament and background—his parents has suffered from drugs—and because 
he considered them to be one source of national debilitation.”92As a result of this belief, Feng’s 
most critical social reform was the complete condemnation of the sale and smoking of opium. 
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Individuals caught trading in any labeled narcotics were arrested, and the drugs were confiscated 
and burned.93  
Feng’s reformist nature, however, did not consist of simple condemnation and criticism 
of narcotics users. In order to cure addicts, Feng set up sanitariums, stocked them with medicine, 
food, supplies, and employed specialists to supervise the rehabilitation. Addicts were encouraged 
to come voluntarily for treatment, but those who were unwilling to were brought by force.94 To 
facilitate the successful treatment of addicts in Feng’s program, after completing rehabilitation 
the recovered persons were sent to the same vocational schools that Feng’s troops attended, 
where they were taught a trade so they could earn an honest living upon release.95 Over the 
period of time Feng governed in Changde, Hunan, he declared three to four hundred people were 
cured of drug addiction from his reforms.96 Sheridan comments that “given the circumstances of 
the time, Feng’s anti-opium program was commendable, even by modern standards.”97 
Accompanying the reforms seeking to eradicate narcotics, gambling was also forbidden. This 
was unquestionably more difficult to enforce as gambling can occur in private homes and be 
unnoticeable. The same can’t be said for Feng’s prohibition of prostitution. As soon as Feng’s 
troops entered a new area, the brothels were immediately closed, and prostitutes were given three 
days to leave the area.98  
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The attempted eradication and rehabilitation of drug use, as well as other condemnable 
vices, assumes a unique and progressive position and sets Feng apart from many of his 
counterparts of the Warlord Era. That said, it must be acknowledged that the policy of opium 
eradication concentrated on lower class citizens, since the education and vocational skill training 
were accompanying the policy, for which upper-class citizens likely would have no use. Unlike 
Feng Yuxiang, to most warlords that sought power and money, vices such as prostitution, 
gambling, and opium were taxable enterprises that easily could have been used to exploit lower 
class citizens. Feng Yuxiang himself was beholden to the circumstances of the time and at 
certain junctures of financial desperation in his governance resorted to taxing these enterprises. 
However, outside of these unique extenuating circumstances, such as financial motives driven by 
famine, Feng stood part from most warlords in that his initial policy intentions and beliefs were 
that society would be better without the existence and temptation of the three vices. Sadly, most 
places Feng visited were plagued for too long by disorder and disunion for him to effectively 
uproot the social vices permanently. While presiding in an area, solid gains and progress were 
made on massive societal reforms, but once Feng left an area, new leadership would come in and 
dismiss Feng’s progress for short-term financial benefits to their own war effort. On one hand, 
Feng Yuxiang’s intentions succeeded in curbing certain societal issues in a drastically 
progressive approach. On the other hand, they resulted in impermanent changes due to 
circumstances rampant within the Warlord Era that limited the capacity for morally progressive 
views. 
Shanxi province’s comparative immunity from outside invasion during the Warlord Era 
allowed Yan Xishan the ability to utilize more assertive, and at times excessive, means in 
implementing social reforms he saw as capable of rapidly modernizing his populace. Previously 
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mentioned was that the harsh geography and mountainous terrain of Shanxi played a large role in 
the isolationist social structure that existed. The individualized nature of governance and issues 
of particular regions of the province created obstacles for Yan Xishan’s governance finding 
uniformity. To combat the detached social structure Yan Xishan relied heavily and ideologically 
on a grassroots and localized responsibility approach. He employed thousands of policemen to 
keep everyone in the province under continual surveillance and required police authorities to 
report to the Taiyuan government, Yan’s regional power base, any violations of provincial 
laws.99 According to one of Yan’s followers, in 1924 the annual provincial crime rate from these 
reforms reduced appreciably to only seventeen robberies in the entire province.100  
Yan Xishan’s governing ideology upheld the Confucian doctrine that people could 
suppress evil desires, but only through intense self-criticism and self-reflection. In order to 
inspire such endeavors, he established the Heart Washing Society (xixin she 洗心社). Gillin 
describes the Heart Washing Society as part of Yan’s Good People Movement (haoren yundong
好人运动), aimed to “inculcate subjects with qualities of honesty, friendliness, dignity, 
diligence, modesty, thrift, obedience.”101 At the weekly gatherings of the Heart Washing Society 
officials, gentry, and students gathered in temples and everyone was encouraged to confess their 
misdeeds for the week, inviting criticism from the rest of the community.102 Yan sought to 
spread the beneficial impact of such gatherings outside of the temples and into a large scale 
social system enforcing collective responsibility. He achieved this by adapting similar traits to 
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the Qing-like collective responsibility system, in which “local officials were punished for the 
misbehavior of anyone under their jurisdiction, heads of families suffered for the misdeeds of 
their relatives, and businessmen and landlords were penalized for the crimes of their associates 
or tenants.”103 In short, Yan Xishan said “No individual must be allowed to slip through the 
net.”104 This eagerness to shape behavior led Yan to release policies and statements that 
emboldened individuals to report one another’s transgressions to the authorities.105 Yan’s 
reforms encouragement of self-surveillance by common people played a vital role in his 
ambition to wipe out “social evils,” such as foot binding of women, idleness, gambling, public 
sloppiness, brawling, and illiteracy.  
The ability to draw upon collective guilt and shame played integral roles in how Yan 
Xishan reshaped Shanxi society. To curb people’s behavior without resorting to the need of a 
vast police force, Yan sought to utilize children and education to pressure local systems. When 
Yan challenged the convention of foot binding by outlawing it completely and established the 
Liberation of Feet (tianzu hui 天足会), he particularly encouraged students in all schools to wear 
badges proclaiming they would not marry girls having bound feet.106 Donald Gillin asserts that 
children were also used as an instrument alongside adults in public shaming of miscreants:  
“Often school children were encouraged to gather outside the homes of 
malefactors and curse the occupants until they came out and promised to mend 
their ways. Other miscreants were surrounded by crowds which lamented their 
behavior in language commonly reserved for funerals or were pursued through 
streets by bands of small girls chanting, ‘Bad man, won’t you be good!’”107  
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Yan Xishan established numerous local organizations designed to root out individuals 
participating in the “social evils” his laws condemned. The Early Rising Society (zaoqi hui 早期
会) knocked on doors and reported persons still in bed after six o’clock and reported them to the 
authorities as being idle and not contributing enough. Often, these social reforms resulted in 
individuals being forced to redeem themselves through labor. This approach aligns Yan Xishan’s 
policies as early stage techniques similar to those later used by the Communist Party, such as 
attempts to make habitual lawbreakers “redeemed through labor.”108 
Yan Xishan’s ideal society may have entailed local villages and governances taking 
responsibility for its citizens to build a prosperous society from the bottom-up. However, in 
practice Yan’s governing policy could be classified as invasive and bordering on a surveillance 
state. Critics of Yan Xishan have often struggled with discerning if his motives were oriented 
toward liberating people in a harmonious manner, or indoctrinating them for his own political 
gains. One example of criticism is in Gillin’s own analysis on the progressive benefits of Yan’s 
government structure, Gillin is sure to mention that when Yan Xishan was modeling his policies, 
“He (Yan Xishan) was impressed profoundly by the unanimity and enthusiasm with which the 
peoples of democracies supported their governments during the war and endeavored to secure 
comparable popular support for his own policies by draping his fundamentally despotic regime 
in the trappings of Western democracy.”109 The resulting policy by Yan Xishan was called 
“government that makes use of the people” (yongmin zhengzhi 用民政治).110 Although this 
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policy was innovative in establishing village assemblies with village headmen elected by the 
local communities, Gillin highlights how Yan instructed his personal magistrates to “visit the 
villages and designate those who should be elected.”111 Critics interpret such actions as Yan’s 
refusal to grant the people true power in electing their representatives and playing a more active 
role in determining state policies. Gillin presumes that “To Yan representative government did 
not mean the achievement of popular sovereignty, which they equated with anarchy; it was 
instead simply a device for arousing public enthusiasm for the policies of their governments.”112 
Despite appropriate criticism of the extent his policies interfered with people’s private lives or 
hindered true political representation, his reforms brought about social reform in Shanxi and 
resulted in the province being identified as the “Model Province” because of the peace enjoyed 
during arguably the most disorderly era of Modern China.   
Despite critics asserting these warlords were limited by short-term pragmatism, there is 
ample evidence they each sought to reshape their spheres of influence into their idealized image 
of Chinese society and improve the living conditions and stability of their respective populaces 
while reducing problematic behaviors and practices by promoting social responsibility. Despite 
certain inhibiting factors that arose out of the Warlord Era that would ultimately impede their 
long-term success, each of these individual warlords’ social reforms were rooted in outlooks at 
durable prosperity for their subjects.  
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Popularized Support Aggrandizes Warlords’ Ideologies 
In addition to the public and social policy reforms, these three warlords demonstrate their 
crucial leadership contributions in their maintenance of popular support. In most cases of 
warlords occupying territories with their armies, the local populations often lamented the 
excruciating tax that resulted on their resources. Particularly due to the reality that the warlords 
and the territory they controlled was in continuous fluctuation, local populations endured this 
volatile oversight as helpless bystanders. However, some warlords of the era were particularly 
effective in persuading their populations that their joined interests were aligned. The methods 
relied upon was often the warlord as moral steward who possessed charisma and disseminated 
information to the masses. Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, and Zhang Zuolin were all efficient 
agents in utilizing these effective methods to gain, and more importantly maintain, the support of 
their subjects.  
 Similar to other political leaders, Zhang Zuolin enhanced his political reputation and 
respect amongst civilians through postured regionalism and by speaking out against the problems 
he viewed as corroding Chinese society. Zhang’s most relatable criticism that reflected common 
perceptions in Manchuria was his view that the moral decline among the nation’s political elite 
was as important as imperialism and socio-economic problems. One example is of Zhang voicing 
his outrage at the “unscrupulous politicians” and corrupt officials in a 1918 telegram, claiming: 
“It has been seven years since the establishment of the Republic, but disasters and upheavals 
struck repeatedly as if there was no end…the unscrupulous ones seized opportunities to stir up 
troubles and put their conspiracies in motion”113 Zhang Zuolin would maintain his stance that the 
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soldiers fighting in the wars were often misled by “immoral” politicians. For instance, in a public 
statement issued in mid-1926, he states: 
“The source of endless internal strife was undoubtedly the soldiers’ intervention 
in politics(junren ganzheng)…; the greatest obstacle to the rule by the people 
(minzhi) was dictatorship…Our central government is now impotent; telegrams 
flooded from all sides discussing the appropriate political solution…On the 
surface, all these ideas are constructive, but if one takes a closer look they might 
be attempts of the disgraced and unemployed politicians who want to use the 
soldiers as a puppet to restore their position…”114 
 
These two statements are critical examples of Zhang’s ability to rally support from 
Manchurian citizens behind his stance of cultural conservatism through representing the 
peoples’ interest in a just government. It also gained heavy support with soldiers who 
appreciated public declarations that they would not be heedlessly thrown into battle for 
selfish political gains. He presented himself as the moral leader capable of protecting the 
integrity of the Republican institution and preventing the “corrupted politicians” from 
having their way.115 
Zhang Zuolin grasped the significance of legitimacy and coalition building. He 
made a cornerstone of his governance his reluctance to act rigidly when considering 
courses of action navigating the political minefield that swamped Northeast China. He 
maintained political support in his region because he was open to negotiation and 
considering alternative political solutions. Zhang was considered to be a different kind of 
political leader, one who did not see politics in all-or-nothing terms and did not resort to 
use of force easily.116 As Ch’i Hsi-sheng notes, the Northeastern warlords, including 
 
114 Kwong, 80.  
 
115 Kwong, 81.  
 
116 Kwong, 89.  
 
42 
 
Zhang Zuolin, “always demonstrated a willingness to negotiate for a peaceful 
settlement.”117 Pivotal to Zhang Zuolin maintaining support in Manchuria was his 
uniqueness from warlords of outside regions.  
The most crucial facet of Zhang’s continued success in maintaining Manchurian 
citizens backing was his posturing for a secure and prosperous Manchuria. Prevailing 
anti-Qing and anti-Manchu sentiments within China proper did not disappear with the fall 
of the Qing dynasty in 1912, but carried over into the politics between Manchuria and 
Beijing in the Republican-era as well. Zhang believed that Manchuria’s position would 
not be secured from its surrounding enemies unless it was supported by a friendly central 
Beijing government or unless he actually controlled it.118 The centuries-old mistrust that 
existed between Manchuria and the central government of China led the Chinese leaders 
in Manchuria to latch onto concerns that the Republican government failed to protect 
their interests and would sell them to foreign world powers.119 This concern was 
justifiable. One case in 1913, Beijing borrowed money from Japan in order to build a 
railway in Manchuria, but after three years was incapable of paying back Japan and 
Republican president Yuan Shikai was forced to accept many clauses in the Twenty-Two 
Demands treaty between China and Japan. Zhang Zuolin received reports that Yuan 
Shikai proposed to cede Jilin Province (a third of Manchuria) to Japan in exchange for 
further financial support of his regime in Beijing.120 Manchurian distrust of the central 
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government’s willingness to sell them to Japan further left them feeling isolated, allowing 
ample opportunity for a man such as Zhang Zuolin to champion Manchurian interests. 
Under Zhang Zuolin Manchuria seemingly prospered, leading people to recognize that 
their political survival depended on their vast support for him.  
  Unique from the regionalism championed by Zhang Zuolin, Feng Yuxiang was 
highly scrupulous in maintaining good relations with the diverse geographical 
communities in which his troops were quartered.121 Feng Yuxiang gained local support 
primarily through the example of proper behavior he sought to set forth through his 
troops. During the Warlord period, when many soldiers were in poor physical condition, 
had little spirit, and antagonized the populace by their unruly behavior, Feng’s troops 
adhered to his strict rules with religious undertones: no smoking, drinking, gambling, and 
use of profane language122 Feng Yuxiang was highly aware of the benefits of creating a 
favorable public image to his governance. Previously discussed was Feng’s commitment 
to propagating Christianity in his reform policies and the persuasion of the public that 
arose from himself and his soldiers exemplifying their spiritual discipline. Conversion 
amongst citizens was not required, but his spiritual devotion did have a coaxing element 
to the citizens who rallied in support for his governance. In towns occupied by Feng, 
daily religious services were held, Bible classes organized, and citizens, regardless of 
being believers or not, were encouraged to read bibles and pray on their own. Every 
Sunday officers and communities assembled to hear religious services from foreign 
missionaries or Feng himself.  
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The sense of community and moral stewardship that Feng Yuxiang provided led 
to a trickle-down effect and appreciation for the moral guidance he preached in his 
reforms. Peasants in the vicinity of Feng’s governance frequently remarked on Feng’s 
sense of justice and fair play.123 Sheridan provides evidence of this in his insightful 
background detailing of Feng’s life, stating under Feng’s leadership that “His men were 
honest in their dealings with people. There was no thievery, and when troop’s found it 
necessary to occupy a portion of man’s land, he was compensated.”124 Feng often had 
food brought in from other towns to relieve pressure on local food supplies and 
demanded troops to pay fair price in currency for needed supplies.125 He prioritized 
gaining the trust of the people in his domain, and when leaving an area he ordered his 
troops to return all borrowed articles and settle all of their local debts.126 Such exemplary 
behavior at times led to citizens lauding Feng’s governance and drawing clear 
distinctions in their mind between him and the typical warlord. One correspondent 
remarked while Feng was in Hunan:  
“Changde is peaceful, kept so by the excellent rule of general Feng. It is really a 
pleasure to see ‘business as usual’ progressing in spite of military 
occupation…the soldiers are not billeted on the people and live in public 
buildings and at the government’s expense. In addition to excellent discipline, 
General Feng provides for the moral uplift of his men.”127 
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Sheridan writes that “most communities where Feng stayed were sorry to see him leave, for 
things usually got worse when his troops departed.”128 This reputation followed Feng Yuxiang to 
the various provinces he governed and he was able to solidify and expand his power base though 
the illustration of himself as an arbiter of moral fortitude. His use of religion and shaping of 
behavior through example proved to be distinguishing factors separating him from other 
warlords of his time.  
 Unlike the other two warlords discussed, Yan Xishan had the massive benefit of Shanxi 
province being incredibly isolated geographically. The biggest advantage from this isolation was 
that Yan Xishan was freer to focuse his army on the massive regional issue of suppressing 
banditry within his domain. Yan understood that to maintain public support for his hardline 
policies, he would need to convince the people they were protected. Shanxi province during the 
Warlord Era was brimming with bandits looting local populations. Although local populations 
sought refuge in walled cities, they too were stormed and looted often, with the bandits 
disappearing into the mountains before Yan’s troops could arrive. In accordance with Yan’s 
grassroots ideological belief of regional prosperity stemming from local governments’ 
responsibility to protect its citizens, he sought to supplement his army by organizing villages into 
local militia (paowei tuan 炮位团)129 These trained local militias, combined with an effective 
reward bounty system, proved instrumental in Yan Xishan’s quelling of banditry in the region.  
 Yan’s effective curbing of banditry within the region afforded him and his army various 
avenues to mingle and convince the civilian population that their best interests were protected. In 
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his in depth of analysis of Yan Xishan’s life, Donald Gillin describes Yan Xishan’s power 
largely coming from his political charisma, graciousness, charm, and unusual level of 
accessibility. Gillin goes on to say that, “He readily accommodated anyone who came to him 
seeking a small loan in order to buy land, build a house, or finance a marriage.”130 In his 
accessibility, Yan Xishan would empathize with Shanxi subjects from all walks of life. In order 
to distance himself from the vastly despised previous Manchu rulers, Yan would openly discuss 
his humble origins and lack of education as pivotal distinguishing factors from the previous 
aristocratic rulers. He deliberately mingled with ordinary farmers and shopkeepers to find out 
how they felt about his policies, hoping that personal contact with them would convince them to 
support his rule.131 Gillin describes Yan’s behavior during his trips as “behaving much like a 
person seeking election to public office. When he initiated a scheme aimed at radically changing 
the structure of village government, for example, he visited a multitude of villages where he 
shook the hands of the local gentry, dined with them, and distributed gifts among the 
villagers.”132 Yan Xishan’s accessibility and charisma demonstrated his acumen for possessing 
what could be called “the common touch.” Yan Xishan’s effective ability to conveying himself 
as one of the people laid a new foundation in Chinese governance, and foreshadows the decades 
later conduct of the Chinese Communist Party’s attempts to persuade the masses that party 
leaders were fellow members of the working class. 
 In navigating the impact of geographic isolation on his popularity and accessibility, Yan 
Xishan implemented an aggressive use of media in order to disseminate his ideas. As discussed 
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earlier, Yan invested heavily in educational reform and emphasis on improving literacy. The 
growing literate population allowed Yan the opportunity to publish multitudes of newspapers, 
lectures, plays, slogans, posters. One major method of distributing his ideology and policy 
information was issuing millions of handbooks in which he conveyed his opinions on aspects and 
behavior of everyday life. Authorities distributed these booklets free of charge to students, 
teachers, officials, and businesses, who were all expected to read them aloud to their illiterate 
neighbors. Titles of Yan’s booklets ranged from What People Must Know (renmin xuzhi 人民需
知) to What Families Must Know (jiating xuzhi 家庭需知).133 Yan Xishan’s manipulation of 
media and his public charisma were solidifying factors in establishing his support from the 
citizens of Shanxi province during this period. His quelling of banditry and the aura of societal 
order served as further evidence to convince people to cede to his assertive reforms, and in return 
Shanxi province would undergo a state of perceived prosperity.  
 
Conclusion 
 In this research I have presented specific reforms by three prominent warlords, Feng 
Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, and Zhang Zuolin, that stemmed from the execution of their ideological 
styles of governance onto their domains. The mid-twentieth century western scholars discussed 
in this paper, by and large, viewed governance during the Warlord Era as a contorted and 
convoluted history. This scholarly discourse has largely held the view that this period symbolizes 
a moment of Chinese society where it had lost its direction and succumbed to evil times. Early 
scholars, such as Lucian Pye, provide paradigms that warlord governance lacked overlying social 
or moral ideologies. Indeed, these scholars assert warlords were reliant on short-term pragmatic 
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policies that solidified their power bases and assured their political survival. This paradigm has 
served as a guide for other scholars who have assimilated the notion that warlord governance 
was simply selfish, chaotic, and violent.  
In this research I have provided a more in-depth overview of the public works, social 
reforms, and popularized support that these three warlords established through the governance of 
their respective regions. Their ideologies were forged from the synthesis of old imperial 
Confucian principles with new modern ideas. This newly synthesized warlord ideology, although 
unique to each individual, infused their reforms with moral and socially progressive ideas. 
Respectfully, each of these three warlords attempted reforms designed to modernize their regions 
economically. Through construction projects involving schools, hospitals, and intricate roadway 
systems, they sought to connect their regions to valuable resources and trade markets, as well as 
provide modern health and education opportunities previously absent in Chinese society. They 
also sought to reshape and mold their societies into moral havens more aligned with their visions 
of social harmony. Lastly, these three warlords were especially prudent in maintaining support 
amongst their populations by acting as moral stewards, possessing political charisma and 
relatability, and championing the concerns of the civilian population.  
While this research has investigated specific reform polices implemented by three 
warlords on a comparative basis, it is not intended to be all-encompassing. Indeed, there is a vast 
spectrum of policies and governance carried out by the countless number of warlords in this 
period. In addition, this project does not argue that all the policy reforms instituted by these three 
warlords were durable reforms that outlasted their respective governance. Factors, such as 
geography, local gentry, and necessity of war, hindered the long-term prospects of these 
institutional reforms. Similarly, more analysis into the three warlords discussed is necessary in 
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order to further understand the motivations behind their particular governance policies. As 
indicated, certain policy reforms by Feng, Yan, or Zhang may have had alternative aims and 
been driven by outside aims of altruism. An argument can be made that these three warlord are 
representative of a smarter class of warlords who understood short-term predatory extraction of 
resources clashed with long-term political survival. Perhaps they weren’t morally superior than 
other warlords through their governance, but simply understood their long-term success and 
power was derived from the people being happy and working. These arguments possess some 
validity but still too closely follow frameworks that mark warlords as merely power-hungry and 
politically driven. Further discussion on individual warlords is vital to understanding and 
developing more holistic arguments. The aim of this research has been to observe more 
comprehensively the governing strategies utilized by certain warlords as they became trailblazers 
in discovering how social harmony should be sought in a modern competitive world.  
More so, the aim of this research has been to further the understanding of warlords as a 
non-monolithic group. Instead, the warlords are best understood as a diverse group of actors who 
combine traditional Chinese governing values with modern views in a new Chinese political 
landscape. The Warlord Era pre-exists the much more observed clash between the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) and Nationalist Party (KMT), in effect making the warlords a crucial 
piece of the transitional period to modern Chinese history. The Warlord Era marks the origin of 
the military strongman as the superlative political authority in Chinese politics. Although the role 
of military in centralizing power arguably served different purposes for the warlords than the 
later CCP and KMT, the later two political parties utilized various governing policies and 
strategies implemented by the warlords. 
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Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, and Zhang Zuolin are warlords that governed with short and 
long-term visions for the development and cultivation of Chinese society. They contributed 
much more than they are given credit for. Many warlords failed to provide China with a tolerable 
and respectable system of governance during this transnational period, leading to the era’s 
reputation as a chaotic mess. In this light, these three particular warlords remain overlooked and 
largely forgotten in modern Chinese history. Future scholarly discourse has an extensive well of 
potential research to draw upon regarding these and other unexplored warlords of this period. By 
more deeply examining the contributions and style of governance other individual warlords 
utilized, we can more objectively analyze the significance of this overlooked time period. If 
Chinese history is defined by the transition from one major imperial dynasty to another with 
intermittent eras of division, then a situation of decentralized power in Chinese politics may 
reoccur. Closer observation of the individual actors within the Warlord Era is integral to 
understanding the fragmentation of power within China, and—if it decentralizes again—how its 
leading actors can effectively navigate the competitive power vacuum.  
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